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On the notion of altruism




Recently, it seems that unselfish aspects such as altruism and fairness receive more attention in the
economic literature. In this paper some historical opinions on the notion of altruism are presented.
Particularly, the views of Spencer and Edgeworth are discussed. Moreover, an effort is made to
develop some links into modern issues.
1 Introduction
One of the most universal assumptions of economics concerns that of self-interested
individuals. Or, as Edgeworth formulates it: "The first principle of Economics is that every
agent is actuated only by self-interest"
2. Most economists in the past and in the present
have supported this view. However, recently economic literature pays more attention to
unselfish aspects such as altruism and fairness (see e.g. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988) and
Bolton (1991)), whereas usually this type of research had been confined to the
psychological literature
3. One of the reasons for the increased interest in these aspects in
economics might be found in the increasing use of experiments. Contrary to other social
sciences such as sociology and psychology, the use of experiments in economics has not
been very common. However, in the last decades economists seem to have discovered the
advantages of experimental methods more and more
4 so that nowadays economic
problems are often studied by means of experiments. Although most experiments concern
1Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg University. Mailing address: Tilburg
University, Department of Economics, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-
mail: Eline.vanderHeijden@kub.nl. Useful comments and suggestions by Corine Brienen, Hugo
Keuzenkamp, Mary Morgan and Harrie Verbon are gratefully acknowledged. This research was
sponsored by the Centre for Population Studies (CEPOP) which is part of the Netherlands’
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).
2See Mathematical Psychics, page 16.
3Of course, people considered unselfish issues before. See e.g. Sen (1976-7), the social welfare
function of Harsanyi (1977), and Hochman and Rodgers (1969) who include agents x’s utility in
agent y’s utility function.
4Probably most important is the possibility of controlling the research environment to a large
extent, so that e.g. ceteris paribus conditions can be established (approximately).
1game theoretic issues, e.g. the establishment of Nash equilibria, some experiments
investigate the possible presence of altruism or unselfishness
5. The lively interest for these
social feelings in the current literature raises the question of the role these feelings played
in earlier literature. Some famous historical writers examined feelings other than
selfishness. In this essay, an attempt is made to represent their views. Particularly, it tries
to indicate what the position of altruism was in the work of Spencer and Edgeworth
6. The
organization is as follows. Section 2 presents some classical views on altruism. The view
of Spencer on altruism and egoism, as expressed in his famous book "The Data on
Ethics", is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 attempts to review the contribution of
Edgeworth’s book "Mathematical Psychics" to the notion of altruism. The last section
consists of a comparison between the views of Spencer and Edgeworth. Some conclusions
are also drawn in that section. Finally, some links with recent issues, particularly results
from experiments, are discussed.
Some expressions occur rather frequently throughout this essay. To ensure that the
meaning is clear, these notions are explained first. According to the Concise Oxford
dictionary, altruism is defined as: "regard for others as a principle of action;
unselfishness". Another rather common definition of altruism is "to attach a positive value
to pay-offs to others (e.g. Becker (1981)). Egoism, on the other hand, is defined (in the
Oxford Concise dictionary) as: "ethical theory that treats self-interest as foundation of
morality; systematic selfishness", where consequently selfish is defined as: "deficient in
considerations for others, thinking chiefly of one’s own personal profit or pleasure,
actuated by self-interest". Finally, the term utilitarianism
7 is often used. This means:
"doctrine that greatest happiness of greatest number should be the guiding principle of
conduct"
8.
5In Section 5 the results of some of these experiments are discussed.
6I emphasize the contributions of these two authors because their thoughts on altruism are very
interesting but at the same time relatively unknown.
7The notion of utilitarianism was already developed by J. Bentham at the end of the 18th
century. The Benthamite tradition still plays a role in modern economics, however.
8Note, however, that not all writers are pleased with this definition. Both Edgeworth and
Spencer criticize this definition, particularly the part of the greatest number. Sidgwick’s definition
reads: greatest possible product of number × average happiness. Edgeworth supports this (see
Section 4) but Spencer challenges the idea of utilitarianism (see Section 3). See also footnote 35
for Sidgwick’s ideas.
22 Classical views on altruism
Before turning to Spencer and Edgeworth, the opinions of several other authors are briefly
described in order to show the involvement with the topic in the course of time. In the
18th century, great philosophers and economists pay attention to the question of whether
the assumption of egoistic or altruistic conduct is correct. The answers differ largely,
however. For instance Hume does not agree with the assumption of self-interested
individuals: "So far from thinking that men have no affection for anything beyond
themselves, I am of opinion, that though it be rare to meet one, who loves any single
person better than himself; yet ’tis rare to meet with one in whom all the kind affections
taken together, do not overbalance all the selfishness"
9. Concerning Smith, most people
think that he endorses another viewpoint, that is to say, that he advocates egoism. In later
work he indeed did (although also not completely
10), but his conviction has not always
been so strong. The next two quotations illustrate this changed view. In his earlier work he
gives unselfishness some room, for instance in the opening sentence of "The Theory of
Moral Sentiments": "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their
happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of
seeing it"
11. In later work, however, he is convinced that the public interest is rather
unimportant as can be seen by the following famous passage: "he intends only his own
gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand, to promote an end
which was no part of his intention"
12.
In the 19th century, also many papers about egoism and altruism have been written. For
instance, J.S. Mill has strong ideas about utilitarianism and altruism. He states, among
other things, that people should have a certain degree of altruism. Along with others, for
instance Spencer, he clearly believes in the progress of society. Moreover, he thinks that
this progress will make the individual behave according to the required altruism: "Mankind
are capable of a far greater amount of public spirit the present age is accustomed to
9See Hume (1736), page 487. The quotations of Hume, Mill and Smith are taken from Collard
(1978), since many historical books were not available in our library.
10See e.g. Skinners’ introduction (1986) to "The Wealth of Nations".
11See Smith (1759), page 47.
12See Smith (1776).
3suppose possible"
13. J.N. Keynes remarks that the ’economic man’ ought not to be
described as a pure egoist
14. However, he believes people to be mainly influenced by a
desire for wealth
15, although non-pecuniary motives may have an impact too. Finally, in
"The Methods of Ethics" (1874), Sidgwick states that the ultimate end of utilitarianism
should be the aim of the greatest sum of (general) happiness. Obviously, he considers
altruism important
16.
3 The view of Spencer
This section discusses Spencer’s "The Data of Ethics". The attention is focused on the
(four) chapters that deal with egoism and altruism. By reading the book one gains a clear
insight into Spencer’s thinking and gradually his idea of due egoism becomes obvious.
In the first chapter discussed here, Egoism versus Altruism, Spencer states that egoism has
to come before altruism. The reason is that a creature must live before it can act. Self-care
is needed to prevent death. Besides, with dying the possibility of caring for others ends.
This is clearly a view in favour of egoism. Moreover, Spencer continues to warn for
inadequate egoism. Egoistic conduct has to meet certain constraints. As Spencer
formulates it: "The pursuit of individual happiness within those limits prescribed by social
conditions is the first requisite to the attainment of the greatest general happiness"
17.
Here, the first refinement in the direction of due egoism has been made. The importance
of due self-regard is stressed again by noting: "Diminutions of general happiness are
produced by inadequate egoism in several ways"
18. He elucidates his warning for
inadequate egoistic behaviour by giving some very nice examples. I will briefly mention
some of them
19. Consider a mother, who in spite of her bad health insists on suckling her
baby, because she believes that natural milk is the best. Eventually she becomes ill,
neglects the other children and causes financial problems. Or consider an overworked clerk
13See Mill (1848).
14See Keynes (1891).
15This is not necessarily own wealth, however.
16In Sections 4 and 5 more attention is paid to his view.
17See page 220.
18Page 221.
19Unfortunately, it would lead me too far afield to discuss the examples extensively. This part
of the book is certainly worth reading, however.
4who, attacked by "scrivener’s palsy", sinks with his family into poverty. Due self-regard is
important to avoid these situations. The conclusion of the chapter is that an individual
with a well-conserved life is by his mere existence a source of pleasure to all around.
Moreover, this individual maintains the ability to increase their happiness by altruistic
actions.
The second chapter is called Altruism versus Egoism. Spencer starts this chapter by
recognizing that egoism is not more important than altruism: "If we define altruism as
being all action which in the usual course of things, benefits others instead of benefiting
self, .., altruism has been no less essential than egoism"
20. Several forms of altruism are
distinguished, varying from primitive natural forms such as parental altruism to a higher
kind of altruism called social altruism, which implies a care for society. It is argued that
the well-being of each is related to the well-being of all. Moreover, in a corollary the
contribution of altruism to happiness is established: "Pure egoism is less successfully
egoistic than is the egoism duly qualified by altruism which, besides achieving additional
pleasures, achieves also, through raised vitality, a greater capacity for pleasures in
general"
21. The conclusion of this chapter is that egoism and altruism has been dependent
on each other.
The next chapter, Trial and Comprise, tries to give a verdict on the conflict raised in the
previous two chapters. The question asked is which of the two, pure egoism or pure
altruism, is correct. Spencer claims that neither of the two is; only a compromise is
possibly. He proves his claim in an indirect way. Suppose that the statement of pure
egoism or selfishness is valid. According to Spencer this is impossible because absolute
disregard of all other beings would cause social dissolution, which is not realistic.
Consequently, he attacks the possibility that pure altruism is valid. First, he argues that the
pursuit of the greatest general happiness is one form of pure altruism. Second, Spencer
shows in various ways that pure altruism commits its adherents to various absurdities. The
exposition is extensive and it is illustrated by several arguments and examples. I will
mention only some of the arguments that impressed me most. One of Spencers’ arguments
20Page 231.
21Page 243.
5states that pure altruism would lead to persons with split personality: on the one hand
extremely unegoistic and on the other hand extremely egoistic. The reason being that
sacrifices in the case of pure altruism imply that everyone is a receiver and a giver.
Irrespective of how you look at it, some opposing forces are at work here: you harm
yourself (e.g. by working) in benefitting others, but at the same time you are selfish by
accepting benefits others have worked for. The second argument mentioned here concerns
the problem of the division of happiness, e.g much of the happiness is self-generated and
hard to redistribute. In this respect Spencer draws the comparison with several other
pleasures of achievement people can experience that are not transferable e.g. the inventor
who has devised a new machine, the man of science who has discovered a truth. These
kind of pleasures are enjoyed privately. Therefore, pure altruism is also not valid and the
conclusion is that egoism and altruism are coessential. Spencer is clear about what form
the compromise between egoism and altruism should take: "General happiness is to be
achieved mainly through the adequate pursuit of their own happiness by individuals; while
reciprocally the happinesses of individuals are to be achieved in part by their pursuit of
the general happiness"
22. Furthermore he stresses that by the progress of society, beliefs
and behaviour have been changed. Spencer formulates this as follows: "The more distinct
assertions of individual claims and more rigorous apportioning of personal enjoyments to
efforts expended, has gone hand in hand with growth of that negative altruism shown in
equitable conduct and that positive altruism shown in gratuitous aid"
23. In my view he
means that the process of an advancing society implies two kinds of changes. First, people
insist completely on the own benefits, that is to say, the proceeds of their own activities.
At the same time, however, care as well as sympathy and respect for others increases as
civilization advances
24.
In chapter 14, titled Conciliation, the effects of the progress of civilization on the
compromise between egoism and altruism are stressed. In Spencer’s picture the society
will move to a state in which people prefer higher instead of lower egoistic satisfactions.
22Page 267. This follows from the statement that most of the happiness must be pursued
indirectly instead of directly.
23Page 268.
24As usual, the pessimistic expectations of Spencer are accompanied by some bright spots.
6These higher satisfactions are reached by altruistic activities in which the others’ happiness
is taken account of. To reach this state, the development of sympathy is important.
Sympathy, on its part, consists of pleasures and pains
25. When society progresses, various
causes of unhappiness (e.g. militant regime, deficiencies of self-control) diminish and
therefore sympathy can become greater. Additionally, Spencer expects the agencies,
through which the sympathy is excited, to become more efficient. He anticipates an
increase in the power of interpreting visible and audible signs of feeling. This increases
the chances of recognition, and correspondingly sympathy may rise. Eventually,
"sympathetic pleasures will be spontaneously pursued to the fullest extent advantageous to
each and all"
26. This implies for the relation between egoism and altruism that "the
conciliation .. such that though the altruistic pleasure, as being part of the consciousness of
one who experiences it, can never be other than egoistic, it will not be consciously
egoistic"
27. Spencer allocates three (remaining) roles to altruism in the future: family-life,
pursuit of harmonious social welfare (which role will further decrease as the need for
regulative actions diminishes by the civilization process), and cases of accidents, diseases
and misfortune in general. Spencer clearly expects a complete process of adjustment when
human nature progresses. Moreover, he expects the opposition between claim for self and
claim for others to disappear. At page 284 he describes it so clearly that it is worth
quoting at length: "The conciliation will be such that the individual will not have to
balance between self-regarding impulses and other-regarding impulses; but, instead, those
satisfactions of other-regarding impulses which involve self-sacrifice, becoming rare and
much prized, will be so unhesitatingly preferred that the competition of self-regarding
impulses with them will scarcely be felt". The motive of altruistic action will be the
security of others’ pleasures. Here, Spencer advocates explicitly his ideas about due
egoism and a rational utilitarian moral theory. The passage proceeds: "Though each, no
longer needing to maintain his egoistic claims, will tend rather when occasion offers to
surrender them, yet others, similarly natured, will not permit him in any large measure to
do this; and that fulfilment of personal desires required for completion of his life will thus
25Spencer’s idea on sympathy is largely similar to Smith’s.
26Page 278.
27Page 279. Here, Spencer makes an illuminating comparison with the process of saving
money. In this process, the aim is usually at the money and the means of getting it; in the
meantime, however, pleasure derived from possession is incidentally experienced.
7be secured to him: though not now egoistic in the ordinary sense, yet the effects of due
egoism will be achieved". With respect to the process several stages can be distinguished.
According to Spencer, the process goes via a stage with egoistic competition to a final
stage with altruistic competition in which the opportunities for altruistic satisfactions are
guaranteed by others.
4 The view of Edgeworth
Edgeworth is mainly known for his theory of the application of mathematics to economics,
particularly in the field of contract and exchange theory
28. His thoughts about egoism and
altruism are not so well-known
29. However, I was really impressed by the clearness and
representation of his arguments. In this essay, mathematical issues are not considered
30.
On the contrary, I only focus on his contributions to the notion of altruism
31.
Edgeworth’s discussion of altruism in his "Mathematical Psychics" starts when the
Calculus of Pleasure is introduced. This calculus may be subdivided into two fields:
Economical Calculus and Utilitarian Calculus. The first part, Economical Calculus,
investigates the equilibrium of a system of hedonic forces each tending to maximum
individual utility. This is in agreement with the standard economic theory of utility
maximizing individuals and profit maximizing firms. However, as already mentioned in
the introduction of this paper, Edgeworth does not agree with the principle of self-
interested man. This pronounced belief influences all of his analyses. Even in Economical
Calculus, which should be aimed at individual utility
32, the assumption of economic
agents is not supported: "if we suppose our contractors to be .. not economic agents, but
actuated .. by a sympathy with each others’ interests .., we might suppose that the object
28Every economist has heard of the Edgeworth-box.
29It is known that Edgeworth’s ideas about altruism and utilitarianism have, to some extent,
been influenced by Sidgwick. In "Mathematical Psychics", Edgeworth refers many times to
Sidgwick. See also Section 5.
30However, I would recommend reading the book completely since only then the total value of
his contribution can be seen, e.g. to the consequences for the exchange theory and for the
adjustments in the Edgeworth-box.
31Collard (1975) presents a very interesting discussion on Edgeworth’s propositions on altruism
and the implications for contract curves.
32At least, according to Edgeworth’s own introduction of Economical Calculus versus
Utilitarian Calculus.
8which X
33 (whose own utility is P), tends -in a calm, effective moment- to maximise, is
not P but P + lP ; where l is a coefficient of effective sympathy"
34. Apparently, in
Edgeworth’s view, Economical Calculus leads more or less automatically to (a form of)
Utilitarian Calculus. The degree of utilitarianism depends on l: when the altruistic
coefficient increases, utilitarianism changes from an impure form towards a more pure
one.
The Utilitarian Calculus investigates the equilibrium of a system in which each and all
tend to maximum universal utility. Edgeworth roughly agrees with the distinction between
(pure) egoism and (pure) utilitarianism made by Sidgwick
35. However, he believes that an
addition to Sidgwick has to be made. He does this in the following passage, which appeals
highly to my imagination
36: "But it has not been observed that between these two
extremes, between the frozen pole of egoism and the tropical expanse of utilitarianism,
there has been granted to imperfectly-evolved mortals an intermediate temperate region;
the position of one for whom in a calm moment his neighbour’s happiness as compared
with his own neither counts for nothing, nor yet ’counts for one,’ but counts for a
fraction"
37. Edgeworth is very specific in his statements; he is convinced that this is the
practical truth. Moreover, he thinks that it is also feasible from a mathematical point of
view. He therefore proceeds by indicating how the idea should be incorporated in the
mathematical framework: "We must modify the utilitarian integral as defined above
(Appendix III) by multiplying each pleasure, except the pleasures of the agent himself, by
a fraction-a factor doubtless diminishing with what may be called the social distance
between the individual agent and those of whose pleasures he takes account"
38. Notice
that Edgeworth does not state that each individual should always behave altruistically. It is
not even necessary that one is always conscious of the altruism and the pursuit of the
33The ’economy’ consists of two agents, X and Y, and P represents the utility of agent Y.
34Page 53.
35Sidgwick states that "we should aim at Happiness generally as our ultimate end, and so
consider the happiness of any one individual as equally important with the general happiness of
any others, as an element of this total: and should distribute our kindness so as to make this total
as great as possible".
36Appendix IV, page 102.
37That is to say l<1.
38Appendix IV, page 102-103.
9general good. No, the judgement can only be given by observing the behaviour of an
individual in a calm or cool moment and examining whether one is prepared to sacrifice
happiness to that of others at that particular moment. Edgeworth beliefs that the 19th
century man is for the most part an impure egoist, a mixed utilitarian. With respect to the
future, he suggests that mixed utilitarianism can be transformed to pure utilitarianism, or
in other words, l®1.
5 Discussion
Even from the limited overview above it becomes clear that several writers have been
touched by the opposition between egoism and altruism. Many of them believe that
feelings of altruism effect people’s behaviour. This view seems to be supported by the
results of an increasing number of economic experiments, run to examine whether people
actually act as predicted by economic theory. This paper gives the historical ideas of
several authors. In the first instance, some opinions have been indicated briefly, after
which the attention has been focused on respectively Spencer and Edgeworth. What
remains to be done in this section is a comparison between their views. First I will
compare their global ideas. In the last part of this section I try to link the discussion on
the work of Spencer and Edgeworth to some modern issues.
At first sight, there seems to be a large difference between the ideas of the two of them.
For instance as Spencer puts it, he has tried the utilitarianism of Sidgwick and condemned
it
39. Edgeworth, on the other hand, roughly agrees with Sidgwick. However, in my view,
if one takes a closer look at both views, it can be seen that the actual differences are not
so large as they seem to be at first sight. Certainly, I think that Edgeworth was more in
favour of altruism than Spencer, but Spencer did not agree with the assumption of self-
interested, egoistic man either. He supports a world consisting of humanistic egoists, in
which some space for altruistic actions has been kept. His theory could be captured by the
expression ’rational utilitarianism’: actions should reap benefits, but they can do so only if
rationally guided. Edgeworth, on the other hand, is convinced that individuals are impure
39See footnote 35 for Sidgwick’s ideas. However, as Edgeworth correctly remarks, Spencer
particularly rejects the idea of general happiness of the greatest number but that has not been
contained in the definition given by Sidgwick.
10egoists or mixed utilitarians. He believes that altruistic feelings and corresponding
behaviour are required to attain the greatest general happiness. Perhaps their views of the
degree of altruism of the present individuals are not so different but their expectations
about the future developments of the egoistic or altruistic individual differ to a larger
extent. Both agree (and who does not) that society progresses but the impact of the
foreseen progress varies. Spencer describes thoroughly what his expectations about the
future are. He roughly believes that the form of altruism will change over time: pleasure
derived from altruism may increase (intensity) but the frequency will decrease when nature
evolves. Edgeworth’s description is much more limited, just as the rest of the book
compared to Spencer’s. Edgeworth thinks that ideally a transformation from a mixed
utilitarian into a pure utilitarian can be realized, so that altruism remains more important
in his view than in Spencer’s. All in all, from the discussion above it can be concluded
that both Spencer and Edgeworth believe that human beings are a mixture of egoists and
altruists. In spite of the fact that personally I believe more in altruism than Spencer does, I
have to admit that the strength of some of his arguments exerted some influence on my
belief
40. Edgeworth’s view, which coincides more with mine, is founded less clearly than
Spencers’, although some of his passages are appealing too. With regard to future
expectations, it is rather surprising that both have such strong ideas about coming
developments
41. It is a century later now and I do not know what their society looked
like. However, I can hardly imagine that their expectations have come true. Perhaps they
will, but I do not think that feelings of altruism are subject to very large changes.
However, it would be interesting to hear what Spencer and Edgeworth would say about
the possible role of altruism in our present society.
More specific, I would like to confront their views with the outcomes of some recent
experiments on aspects of altruism and fairness. Let me explain what I mean. Nowadays,
many economic experiments are run. Probably most experiments concern bargaining
situations. A specific sort of (simple) experiments within this class are the so-called
ultimatum games experiments. In an ultimatum game, two players have to divide a certain
40Particularly, I found the arguments in Chapter 14 rather convincing.
41It is not exactly clear, however, what period of time they have in mind when they talk about
the future.
11amount of money, say c. One player (proposer) has to make a proposal and the other
player can accept or reject this. From a game theoretic point of view the proposal "keep
the total amount c (or slightly less)" is predicted. In experiments, however, a lot of
proposals consist of more or less equal splits, i.e. 0.5c. Very few players act in accordance
with the rule predicted by game theory (see e.g. Prasnikar and Roth (1991) and Güth
(1993)). Their behaviour, however, is consistent with Edgeworth’s ideas as in his view the
happiness, i.e. the monetary reward, of others also counts. Whether it fits in Spencer’s
view is less clear: the game does not belong to one of the categories to which Spencer
would assign a role of altruism (see Section 3), although the happiness of others is
involved in a direct way. Therefore, the degree of the altruism as indicated by the actual
behaviour of the players would probably not have been expected by Spencer.
Finally I would have liked to discuss (with them) the possible effect of altruism on the
provision of public goods and the development of social security programs. Experiments
on public goods
42 indicate that people do not always act selfishly when they can make
decisions about the provision of public goods (see e.g. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988)).
Moreover, since the end of the 19th century, when both authors lived, the provision of
public goods increased considerably and several social security programs have been
established. What would Edgeworth and Spencer think of these developments? Again, I
believe that the developments do not conflict with Edgeworth’s predictions. As a first
reaction to Spencer I am inclined to say that he might have been surprised since he thinks
that the progress of society implies that the need for altruism decreases. One might argue
that the establishment of several social security systems indicates that the need for altruism
has not decreased apparently
43. As mentioned before, however, only Edgeworth and
Spencer themselves would have been capable to evaluate the presence of altruism and the
need for (further) altruism in our present society according to their definitions and their
views.
42I am not familiar with results of experiments on social security systems. Some possible
experiments on pensions are described in Van der Heijden (1994); we will soon start running some
of them.
43On the other hand, however, one might argue that by this establishment some aspects of
altruism, sympathy, and solidarity are introduced in the society automatically; people have hardly
anything to choose after the introduction. Spencer could then argue that the need for further
altruism indeed decreases.
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